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Introduction 
 
Writing in this issue, the former High Court judge, Sir Michael Tugendhat, sets out to correct 
a popular misunderstanding about the creative nature of the common law judge’s role.1 Those 
– most prominently, members of the tabloid press – who decry the judicial “activism” that they 
perceive as having led to the development of stronger privacy protections in English law have 
misunderstood what it is that common law judges do. For it is in the very nature of the common 
law to develop in order that it can adapt to broader social changes. This development can take 
place only through judicial elaboration of its doctrines and principles. Seen in this light, 
Tugendhat argues, the recognition and development of the cause of action known as “misuse 
of private information” (MPI) represents an entirely legitimate exercise of judicial creativity 
that is within the limits of the judiciary’s constitutional role. 
 
In the course of making his argument, Tugendhat suggests that the case of Campbell v Mirror 
Group Newspapers Ltd – the House of Lords case that laid the foundations for the emergence 
of the MPI doctrine – is an instance of (entirely legitimate) judicial activism.2 He is right to say 
that the development that takes place in that case is legitimate, since it sits well within the limits 
of the courts’ constitutional role. However, describing the case as “activist” is potentially 
problematic. For it intuitively suggests that the decision represents a fairly radical development 
of the law. “Activism” is an unhelpful label wherever it is applied. But insofar as it is suggestive 
of a radical rather than a limited development, Campbell is a case particularly unsuited to that 
label. Campbell involves only a limited development of the law pertaining to confidential 
information. As such, Tugendhat is certainly right that it is entirely defensible against criticism 
that it is an overly “activist” decision. But I would go further: it ought not to be considered 
“activist” at all.  
 
For rather than heralding the introduction of a distinct, novel cause of action apt to protect 
claimants’ privacy interests, the Campbell decision moved the law only slightly beyond the 
position it had, by that time, already reached through the older, equitable doctrine of 
confidence. This was in preference to recognising a broad tort of “invasion of privacy”, or even 
a number of discrete torts protecting distinct aspects of privacy.3 In making only relatively 
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1 [EDITOR: CROSS-REFERENCE TO TUGENDHAT ARTICLE CITATION] 
2 [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457. 
3 Four discrete privacy torts are recognised in the US under the Restatement of the Law (Second): Torts (2d), vol 
3 (American Law Institute, 1977), 376. (See also William Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48(3) Cal LR 383, 389.) In 
New Zealand, a “private facts” tort was recognised in Hosking v Runting (n 65, below). Both Ontario, Canada 
and New Zealand have, in recent years, recognised “intrusion” torts similar to that contained in the US 
minor doctrinal changes to the position English law had already found itself in, the House of 
Lords threw its weight behind an unhelpful tendency to “shoe-horn” all types of privacy 
interests into a legal mechanism suited only to dealing with the non-consensual publication of 
private facts.4 This has left English law with an inflexibility in respect of protecting individuals’ 
privacy interests that has given rise to considerable uncertainty. In this essay, I evidence and 
critique one particular instance of this uncertainty: the confusion surrounding the very nature 
of the MPI doctrine. It is unclear whether the doctrine is part of tort law, or equity, or – perhaps 
– something else entirely. And whilst the courts have been forced recently to grapple with this 
conundrum, detailed analysis of their efforts reveals that the question has not been satisfactorily 
settled.5 
 
As such, Campbell may indeed be criticised for undermining legal certainty. But this 
uncertainty stems not from its activism but from its inactivism. The ambiguity surrounding the 
nature of MPI comes from equivocation in Campbell about its existence, its contours and its 
doctrinal roots. The House missed an opportunity to recognise, unequivocally, a distinct tort of 
invasion of privacy (or to delineate discrete privacy torts). Had it been less cautious and taken 
this opportunity, at least one of the core concerns – a lack of certainty – raised by those who 
(mistakenly) bemoan its activism could have been avoided.  
 
1. Judicial Activism and Incrementalism 
 
“Judicial activism” is a term that is often used pejoratively as a label for judges’ decisions that 
extend the law in a particular field in a manner the critic finds illegitimate, usually on the 
grounds of a democratic deficit in the judicial decision-making process. Dyson Heydon, for 
example, uses it to mean the use of judicial power 
 
for a purpose other than that for which it was granted, namely doing justice 
according to law in the particular case. It means serving some function other 
than what is necessary for the decision of the particular dispute between the 
parties. Often the illegitimate function is the furthering of some political, moral 
or social programme: the law is seen not as the touchstone by which the case in 
hand is to be decided, but as a possible starting point or catalyst for developing 
a new system to solve a range of other cases.6 
 
                                                          
Restatement, in the cases of Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32, 108 OR (3d) 241, and C v Holland [2012] NZHC 
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Tugendhat’s defence of judicial activism points up the historical commitment in England to 
the judicial development of the common law. He reminds us that English judges have been 
elaborating and expanding the common law for many hundreds of years without any need for 
the involvement of the legislature. There are those for whom the lack of legislative involvement 
inherent in the common law is simply wholly undemocratic, thus rendering the entire notion of 
common law unacceptable to them. Keith Ewing, for example, refuses to acknowledge a 
meaningful distinction between the sort of legitimate “judicial” law-making that Tugendhat 
defends and “legislative” activity. For Ewing, all law-making is legislative in character and is 
thus not a legitimate use of judicial power; it should always be left to an elected legislature. As 
a result, he takes the view that the judicial pronouncement of novel legal rules is an affront to 
democracy:  
 
[T]he judicial role ought to be a limited one: it is not the job of the judicial branch 
to make the law, in the sense of laying down rules of general application which 
will apply to people other than the parties in a dispute before the courts. That is 
a legislative function for which the judicial process is wholly unsuited. … 
 
It is perhaps inappropriate that law should be made in this way, and it is perhaps 
obvious that there should be no role for the common law proper in a properly 
functioning democracy. The common law is a process of law-making developed 
in a pre-democratic era, and maintained by a non-democratic form. All law, 
public or private, should be codified with a transparent democratic root.7 
 
This is obviously an extreme position. Ewing favours the adoption of an exhaustive civil code 
– along the lines of continental legal systems – in order to dispense with the need for any 
judicial creativity. His view is obviously incompatible with the common law system that 
prevails in England and Wales and, as such, it is not a view with which Tugendhat’s defence 
of activism can usefully engage. It does, however, usefully demonstrate just how far an absolute 
commitment to democratic involvement in law-making might take us down a path of highly 
prescriptive formalism. 
 
Criticism of judicial activism features centrally (although not in so many words) in the attack 
launched by the Editor in Chief of the Daily Mail, Paul Dacre, on the development of the 
doctrine of misuse of private information. Addressing the Society of Editors in 2008, Dacre 
said that 
 
the British Press is having a privacy law imposed on it … This law is not coming 
from Parliament – no, that would smack of democracy – but from the … 
judgements … of one man.8 
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transcript can be found at  
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 The “one man” that Dacre was referring to was Mr Justice Eady, a High Court judge who, 
having at one time occupied the role of judge in charge of the jury list, has heard a substantial 
number of the MPI cases brought before the courts. Much in Dacre’s speech is not worth 
dignifying with a detailed reply, since one suspects – given his highly selective antipathy 
towards judicial creativity – that he simply objects to the development of greater legal privacy 
protections per se.9 But the suggestion that only Parliament, and not judges, ought to be driving 
the development of privacy law is one that others have subsequently pursued. The then Prime 
Minister, David Cameron, indicated broad agreement with Dacre’s sentiments when, in 2011, 
he said that 
 
What’s happening here is that judges are using the European Convention on 
Human Rights to deliver a sort of privacy law without Parliament saying so. … 
The judges are creating a sort of privacy law whereas what ought to happen in a 
parliamentary democracy is Parliament … should decide how much protection 
do we want for individuals and how much freedom of the press.10 
 
Tugendhat is, therefore, quite right to identify this line of argument as one that needs a 
response. Responding to it, however, is not easy when the charge – “activism” – is an under-
determinate one. Put simply, what amounts to “activism” is entirely in the eye of the beholder, 
and the perspective from which the beholder views it is rarely obvious to anyone else. For 
example, Dacre and Cameron might be read as espousing the Ewing view. However, that would 
hardly cohere with Cameron’s conservative instincts (which would, surely, compel him to 
defend Britain’s common law tradition). Nor would it sit well with Dacre’s well-known 
Euroscepticism (which would surely make it difficult for him coherently to argue for a 
continental-style civil code to be adopted in the UK). So it seems more likely that they would, 
unlike Ewing, accept some degree of judicial law-making, but it is wholly unclear where they 
think the line ought to be drawn.  
 
The problem with the term “activism” is that it tries – and fails – to capture a nuanced scale of 
approaches to judging with a simple, black and white dichotomy (between “activism” and 
“inactivism”). It is a blunt instrument. The reality is that judicial creativity contains many 
different shades of grey. Some decisions develop the law further from its previous position than 
others. As Lord Goff once put it: 
 
Occasionally, a judicial development of the law will be of a more radical nature, 
constituting a departure, even a major departure, from what has previously been 
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considered to be established principle, and leading to a realignment of subsidiary 
principles within that branch of the law.11 
 
Many decisions, however, will make only piecemeal changes to existing doctrine. One way in 
which we might better conceive of the spectrum of activism is by utilising Lesley Dolding and 
Richard Mullender’s notions of “narrow” and “wide” forms of incrementalism as the basis for 
this scale. Incrementalism is the term they (and others) use to describe the process by which 
the judiciary incrementally extend the law (eg in tort) to respond to novel situations. This is 
most obviously achieved by adopting an analogical method of reasoning – locating similarities 
of fact or of underlying legal principle between earlier cases and the instant case. As a mode 
of judging, it has its roots in the judgment of Brennan J in the Australian High Court negligence 
case of Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, in which he stated: 
 
It is preferable … that the law should develop novel categories of negligence 
incrementally and by analogy with existing categories, rather than by massive 
extension of a prima facie duty of care…12  
 
Although this approach was not actually adopted by the majority in Sutherland, it was seized 
upon by the House of Lords in the famous negligence case of Caparo v Dickman Plc and has 
become integral to the methodology of English tort law.13 In recent years, moreover, the 
concept of incrementalism has been promoted as a way of ensuring judicial law-making 
throughout private law remains within the limits of the courts’ constitutional role.14 
 
The “narrow” and “wide” forms of incrementalism identified by Dolding and Mullender 
provide useful points on a scale of activism (though neither represent the absolute extremes). 
“Narrow incrementalism” is a form of adjudication that is “doctrine-bound” and tends in the 
direction of formalism. A judge operating in the narrow incremental mode would, for example, 
impose liability in novel circumstances only if a “tight analogy” with existing precedent could 
be drawn. One advantage of narrow incrementalism, for its proponents, is that it ensures 
relatively strong continuity in a given field.15 As such, it promotes a degree of legal certainty 
– something that is frequently cited as a core element of the rule of law, particularly by those 
who espouse a formalistic conception of the rule of law, such as Joseph Raz.16 In other words, 
narrow incrementalism is perceived as a recipe for legitimacy in the judicial elaboration of the 
common law, on the basis that it promotes a core rule of law value. 
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16 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (OUP 1979); Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton University Press 
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By contrast, “wide incrementalism” does not regard the absence of a tightly similar precedent 
as necessarily fatal to a novel claim. Instead, it treats precedent as a source of guidance as to 
the principles that underpin a particular field of law (such as tort) and which might indicate the 
direction in which the law ought to develop. Wide incrementalism is thus significantly more 
receptive to “strongly novel claims” than the narrow variant.17 
 
Judicial activism is thus not an all-or-nothing concept but a matter of degree. Some decisions 
tend more to the wide end of the spectrum than others. But providing a decision remains 
plausibly connected to precedent – whether by tight factual analogy or by embracing the same 
underlying principle – the decision remains “incremental”. So long as this is the case then the 
decision remains within the constitutional limits of the judicial role.18 It is Tugendhat’s 
argument that many English judicial decisions – particularly within the controversial field of 
privacy – sit defensibly within the constitutional limits on the judiciary’s law-making power. 
He is quite right. But for the reasons we shall consider in the next section, the case of Campbell 
is actually a case that sits towards the narrow end of the incrementalism spectrum we have 
identified. As such, identifying it as “activist” is potentially problematic, since it may 
encourage the mistaken belief that the case implemented a more radical change in the law than 
it really did. 
 
2. When is a Tort not a Tort? 
 
Despite considerable time having been spent analysing the intricacies of the Campbell ruling, 
academics have not really engaged with one of the biggest doctrinal questions that the case 
raises; whether the House of Lords actually developed a novel cause of action. Neither had 
judges engaged with this question until a recent case – Vidal-Hall v Google Inc – required them 
to do so.19 For despite the appearance of novel nomenclature – “misuse of private information” 
– in that case, there is no unequivocal evidence in the judgments of an intention to recognise a 
new tort. The prevailing wisdom amongst most privacy academics at present is that, somehow, 
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Literature 321, 327-328. 
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avoids “unpredictability and uncertainty” so far as possible, on rule of law grounds. As we will see, “narrow” 
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legitimate incrementalism is a matter of degree.  
19 Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB), [2014] 1 WLR 4155 (High Court), and [2015] EWCA Civ 
311, [2016] QB 1003 (Court of Appeal). See pp [NUMBER TO BE INSERTED – PAGES ON THE Vidal-Hall 
CASE], below. 
MPI was developed from the equitable doctrine of confidence in that case.20 But a satisfactory 
answer to the question of just how this was achieved remains elusive. It is also unclear whether 
MPI is equitable, tortious or something else entirely. In other words, the very nature of the 
cause of action Campbell is credited with (and criticised by some for) bringing into being is 
unclear. This is significant because even those who criticise Campbell for being overly activist 
would have cause to be troubled by the uncertainty that this lack of clarity has engendered. 
This uncertainty caused some procedural problems that the courts had to grapple with in Vidal-
Hall (to which we shall return, below). It also raises questions (which it is beyond the scope of 
this essay to attempt to answer) about the basis for damages awards. For instance, it is not clear 
whether MPI damages ought to be assessed as tortious damages or as equitable damages in lieu 
of injunctive relief. Traditionally, tortious damages have been based on the loss incurred by the 
claimant, whilst equity reacts to unjustified gain by the defendant, and so the bases for these 
different sorts of awards are distinct. Whilst it could be argued that the common law and equity 
are now effectively fused so as to make these sorts of traditional distinctions irrelevant, full 
fusion has never been unequivocally confirmed by the courts. Moreover, those who would 
oppose the judicial recognition of fusion would tend to be the same sort of formalism-inclined 
critics who oppose judicial activism. As we have noted, proponents of a tightly limited creative 
role for the courts tend to prioritise legal certainty. A failure to achieve it ought to cause such 
critics considerable consternation. 
 
It is not the aim of this essay to provide the elusive answer to the question of just how MPI 
emerged in a legal system that previously recognised only equitable confidentiality as a 
mainstream privacy doctrine. Instead, the essay aims to achieve three more modest things in 
the analysis that follows. First, it will demonstrate that Campbell can properly be considered a 
decision involving only limited – narrowly incremental – activism. Second, it will evidence 
and highlight the fact that there is an enduring lack of clarity as to the nature of MPI. Third, 
the consequences of this lack of clarity for the legal certainty that anti-activist critics tend to 
prioritise will be explored. In order to achieve these aims, two elements of the Campbell 
decision must be examined. We will first consider the doctrinal changes wrought as a matter 
of formal law. We then need also to consider subsequent judicial statements about the 
implications of those doctrinal developments. 
 
2.1 The Judgments in Campbell 
 
Campbell was pleaded in breach of confidence.21 Yet because both novel nomenclature and at 
least one novel formulation of the test for liability emerge from the House of Lords’ opinions 
                                                          
20 See, for example, Rebecca Moosavian, ‘Charting the journey from confidence to the new methodology’ 
(2012) 34(5) EIPR 324; Patrick O’Callaghan, Refining Privacy in Tort Law (Springer 2013) 97ff. Raymond 
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Freedom (OUP 2013) at 69 and 103ff. 
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of photographs taken of her in public leaving a meeting of Narcotics Anonymous, along with details of her 
treatment for addiction to controlled drugs. 
in the case,22 it is unclear whether the claim was disposed of using the same cause of action as 
that within which it was pleaded. As a matter of formal law, the doctrine emerging from 
Campbell is distinct from, though still reminiscent of, the law of confidence. Gavin Phillipson 
summarises the Campbell “transformation” of breach of confidence thus: 
 
[T]he second limb of the breach of confidence action – requiring that there must, 
in addition to being unauthorised use of confidential information, be 
‘circumstances importing an obligation of confidence’ – has been removed. 
Meanwhile, the first limb – that the information must have ‘the quality of 
confidence’ – has been transformed: the notion that the information must be 
‘confidential’ has morphed into a requirement that it be ‘private’ or ‘personal’ 
information.23  
 
This “transformation”, however, raises the question of just what has happened to the equitable 
doctrine of confidence. It is far from obvious whether that cause of action endures but with a 
new formulation, or whether it has been replaced by a new, tortious formulation, or whether a 
novel cause of action has been recognised that, whilst similar to the doctrine of confidence, 
exists separately from it. The first option would rule out MPI being regarded as a separate 
doctrine, whilst the second would rule out the possibility that equitable confidence could 
continue to exist in its own right along its original lines. The third option would logically permit 
both MPI and equitable confidence to have their own, separate existences, and so it today seems 
the most ostensibly plausible.24 But this third option would raise further questions about the 
extent to which MPI is conceptually distinct from equitable confidence; whether it is a branch 
of the equitable tree (which, presumably, would render it equitable), whether it is a sui generis 
tort, or whether it is something entirely new (perhaps some sort of hybrid). 
 
The opinions of their Lordships in Campbell are ambiguous on these points. The majority – 
Lord Hope (to whose judgment we will shortly return), Lord Carswell and Baroness Hale – 
refer to the doctrine in terms of equitable confidence. Although Baroness Hale recognises novel 
methodology, including the adoption of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, she is also 
adamant that the law can develop only in a very limited fashion. She is clear that “the courts 
will not invent a new cause of action to cover types of activity which were not previously 
covered” and that “our law cannot, even if it wanted to, develop a general tort of invasion of 
privacy.”25 Lord Carswell, giving the shortest judgment in the case, believes the court’s 
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whichever cause of action might be in play; the judges in the case end up proposing three distinct tests for 
determining whether the published information is “private”. See NA Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A 
Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 LQR 628. 
23 Gavin Phillipson, ‘The Common Law, Privacy and the Convention’ in Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson and 
Roger Masterman (eds), Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2007) 217, citing the 
traditional formulation from Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] FSR 415, 419. 
24 Particularly in light of the High Court and Court of Appeal’s determinations in Vidal-Hall that both MPI and 
breach of confidence exist separately. See pp [NUMBER TO BE INSERTED – PAGES ON THE Vidal-Hall 
CASE], below. 
25 Campbell, n 2, [133]. 
decision comes down to “the application of reasonably well settled principles”, rather than the 
development of anything particularly novel or radical.26 
 
Lord Nicholls refers to the privacy action using novel nomenclature (“misuse of private 
information”).27 However, he also talks of the existence of only one such cause of action.28 
Indeed, he is consistent in referring only to one cause of action, which he initially describes in 
equitable terms29 before moving to “better encapsulate[]” it by calling it a “tort of misuse of 
private information”.30 He regards the old breach of confidence “nomenclature” as 
“misleading”.31 Lord Nicholls believes that the principle underpinning MPI, “however [the 
doctrine is] labelled”, is “respect for one [informational] aspect of an individual’s privacy”.32 
This, which is distinct from the equitable principles underpinning traditional confidence 
doctrine, reveals the doctrine to have “changed its nature” following the earlier Spycatcher 
ruling.33 The doctrine, he says, has “firmly shaken off the … need for an initial confidential 
relationship”.34 In protecting privacy, the key question has become “whether in respect of the 
disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy.”35 Thus Lord 
Nicholls paints a picture, in Campbell, whereby the equitable doctrine of confidence morphs 
into “misuse of private information”. He does not, however, explain how this has been 
achieved.  
 
In his judgment in Campbell, Lord Hoffmann is not clear about how he sees the law as having 
developed, but there are indications that he perceives things in a different fashion from Lord 
Nicholls. He states that, following Spycatcher and the passing of the HRA, there “has been a 
shift in the centre of gravity of the action for breach of confidence when it is used as a remedy 
for the unjustified publication of personal information”.36 Thus,  
 
[i]nstead of the cause of action being based upon the duty of good faith 
applicable to confidential personal information and trade secrets alike, it focuses 
upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity – the right to control the 
dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to the esteem 
and respect of other people.37 
 
                                                          
26 Ibid, [162]. 
27 Ibid, [14]. 
28 Ibid. “The essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private information.” (Emphasis added.) 
29 Ibid, [13]. 
30 Ibid, [14]. 
31 Ibid, [13]. 
32 Ibid, [15]. 
33 Attorney General v Observer Ltd (No.2) (“Spycatcher”) [1988] UKHL 6, [1990] 1 AC 109 (Spycatcher). In 
Spycatcher, Lord Goff held that “[a] duty of confidence could arise where ‘an obviously confidential document 
is wafted by an electric fan out of a window into a crowded street, or where an obviously confidential document, 
such as a private diary, is dropped in a public space, and is then picked up by a passer-by”, (at 281). 
34 Campbell, n 2, [14]. 
35 Ibid, [21] (emphasis added). 
36 Ibid, [51] (emphasis added). 
37 Ibid. 
In this passage (and throughout the parts of his judgment where he discusses the development 
of the law of privacy), Lord Hoffmann hints at the emergence of a second branch of confidence 
law when he uses the qualifying statement “when it is used as a remedy for the unjustified 
publication of personal information”, since it suggests that, when the doctrine of confidence is 
used for other reasons – such as the protection of trade secrets – there has not been a shift in its 
centre of gravity. This whole passage could thus be read as supporting the notion that there is 
just one operative cause of action (if one reads down the qualifying statement), or as tentatively 
suggesting that a new cause of action has emerged from (and now sits alongside) the earlier 
one (if one reads it up). As such, Lord Hoffmann equivocates. And, when taken in context with 
his judgment in the later case of OBG,38 this equivocation indicates the presence of a 
disconcerting incoherence in his Lordship’s vision of the manner in which the law in this field 
has developed. It is also unclear (if he is in fact expressing some support for the notion of a 
new, parallel cause of action having come into being) whether he perceives the tangential line 
of authority dealing with private information as being tortious or equitable. For on the one 
hand, his discussion is rooted in confidence law and he continues to talk of “the action” in the 
singular sense.39 But on the other hand, he gives us the tense-equivocal statement that “[b]reach 
of confidence was an equitable remedy and equity traditionally fastens on the conscience of 
one party to enforce equitable duties which arise out of his relationship with the other.”40 This 
sentence relates equity in both the past and present tenses to either the historical shape of the 
doctrine or to its 2004 shape and thereby somewhat obscures his meaning. 
 
Lord Hope’s judgment gives us a third way. He rejects Lord Hoffmann’s view that the centre 
of gravity within breach of confidence has shifted: “It seems to me that the balancing exercise 
to which that guidance is directed is essentially the same exercise, although it is plainly now 
more carefully focussed and more penetrating.”41 He initially sets out his analysis in the manner 
of the traditional elements of equitable confidence, asking whether the information in question 
is confidential. Like the other judges, however, he then goes on to undertake a balancing 
exercise between “free speech” and “privacy”.42 Lord Hope thus essentially applies the 
Spycatcher model of confidence to the facts of Campbell, with a nod to the need to balance the 
competing Art.8 and 10 rights when assessing the legitimacy of publication.43 Whilst he uses 
the term “private” to describe the information later in the judgment,44 Lord Hope does so in the 
clear belief that it is this single action for breach of confidence that is operative, having been 
expanded to provide a remedy for breaches of informational privacy. His approach, then, is to 
reject the notion that there has been any significant change to the doctrine of confidence post-
                                                          
38 In OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, Lord Hoffmann summed up the effect of the Campbell 
ruling in terms that seem to invoke Lord Nicholls’ approach rather than his own earlier view: “In recent years, 
English law has adapted the action for breach of confidence to provide a remedy for the unauthorised disclosure 
of personal information…” (at [118]). 
39 Campbell, n 2, [44], [46]. 
40 Ibid, [44]. 
41 Ibid, [86]. 
42 Ibid, [103]. 
43 Ibid, [82-3], [86]. Spycatcher, n 33. 
44 Campbell, n 2, esp. [92]. 
Spycatcher (and thus he implicitly rejects the idea that the operative cause of action in 
Campbell is tortious rather than equitable). 
 
The analysis in this section gives us a basis upon which to conclude that Campbell is not a clear 
instance of significant judicial activism. The judgments within Campbell resemble “narrow 
incrementalism” more than they do its “wide” variant. First, there is no unequivocal statement 
of an intention to recognise a novel head of liability. Second, there is no unequivocal statement 
that the cause of action relied upon has changed its basis from being equitable to being tortious. 
Third, there is a clear rejection (in Baroness Hale’s judgment) of any suggestion that the court 
has recognised – or indeed that it could recognise – a general privacy tort, echoing the 
sentiments that Lord Hoffmann expressed just a year earlier in the case of Wainwright.45 
Instead, she insists that the courts will respond only to “types of activities” already covered by 
an existing head of liability; the publication of private or confidential information was, of 
course, already covered (to an extent) by the doctrine of confidence. Fourth, although Lord 
Nicholls’ nomenclature, “misuse of private information”, has subsequently become the 
terminology associated with the Campbell doctrine, it was adopted only by him and, even 
within his own judgment, it does not indicate a clear intention to recognise a novel head of 
liability; he equivocates on the extent of MPI’s novelty, as we have seen. Fifth, it is not wholly 
clear what exactly the test for liability is under Campbell. As Moreham pointed out in 2005, as 
many as three distinct tests for liability appear to be deployed in the case. Subsequent cases 
have refined the methodology to the point that, today, there is no major concern about this.46 
But there is certainly no great clarity provided by Campbell itself. This seems to be, in large 
part, due to the lack of consensus on the nature of the cause of action in play. 
 
At this stage, one further point about Campbell can be made. This is that the judgments within 
it indicate a broad concern that the House ought not to appear to be acting in a particularly 
activist fashion. In part, this can be comprehended by recalling that, in the early 2000s, there 
was considerable academic debate as to the possible “horizontal effect” of the Human Rights 
Act 1998.47 Campbell was an opportunity for the House to clarify not only the extent of the 
privacy protections available under the English common law, but also to give an indication of 
                                                          
45 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406. 
46 The most significant refinements of the doctrine occur in the cases of Re S (A Child) [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 
1 AC 593 (in which the “ultimate balancing test” is elucidated by Lord Steyn at [17]); and Murray v Express 
Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481 (in which the Court elaborates on the evidential matters 
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[1998] PL 423; Richard Buxton, ‘The Human Rights Act and private law’ (2000) 116 LQR 48; William Wade, 
‘Horizons of horizontality’ (2000) 116 LQR 217; Anthony Lester and David Pannick, ‘The Impact of the 
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common law progressively - horizontality, the Human Rights Act and the South African experience’ [2004] 
EHRLR 286. Later contributions of note include Nicole Moreham, ‘Privacy and horizontality: relegating the 
common law’ (2007) 123 LQR 373; Gavin Phillipson, ‘Clarity postponed: horizontal effect after Campbell’ in 
Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson and Roger Masterman (eds), Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights 
Act (CUP 2007). 
the manner in which it would give effect horizontally to the provisions of the HRA. Seen in 
this light, statements such as Baroness Hale’s that the courts “will not invent” new causes of 
action might be seen as laying down a marker for the extent of judicial creativity that could be 
expected in response to horizontal human rights claims. The judgments thus paint a picture – 
whether accurate or not – of a court committed to limiting creativity in the common law to the 
development of liability rules under existing heads of liability. This approach to common law 
development is a classic hallmark of the narrow incremental mode.48 So there is both evidence 
of narrowly incremental thinking taking place in Campbell, and a contextually appropriate 
explanation for it. 
 
Put simply, notwithstanding its status as a seminal case for privacy rights, formally speaking 
Campbell is something of a fudge. The House of Lords appears at pains not to appear activist. 
It emphasises (indeed, it arguably over-emphasises) the continuity between the methodology 
in earlier breach of confidence cases (including those after the coming into force of the Human 
Rights Act 1998) and downplays the notion that its ruling represents a significant, novel 
development. The result of this fudge is, troublingly, that subsequent courts had little evidence 
to indicate the nature of the cause of action that has come to be known as “misuse of private 
information”. Nobody had much of a clue whether we were now grappling with an equitable 
doctrine, a tort, or something else entirely. As we will shortly see, this situation could not 
endure indefinitely and eventually demanded a resolution. 
 
Before we move on, however, it is appropriate to highlight a possible objection to my argument. 
Chris Hunt has argued that Campbell represents a radical change in the law because it alters 
fundamentally the elements of the doctrine of confidence in a manner that does “impermissible 
violence” to that equitable action.49 He argues that the alteration to the law of confidence 
wrought by Lord Goff’s judgment in Spycatcher was itself an illegitimate and unprincipled 
change that was, technically speaking, merely obiter, and which Lord Goff himself may not 
have intended to be a definitive reworking of its elements. As such, Hunt argues that there was 
no need for the House in Campbell to adopt it as its starting point when it considered the 
elements of equitable confidence. Having established this to his satisfaction, Hunt goes on to 
argue that dispensing with the second limb of the Coco formulation of equitable confidence is 
a “radical” change to that doctrine, since it is unsupported by either precedent or principle.50 
An objection to my argument might thus be raised along the lines of Hunt’s thesis – that 
Campbell ought properly to be considered a radical development of the law because of the 
“harm” (as Alexandra Sims puts it) it has done to the equitable doctrine of confidence.51 
 
                                                          
48 It also maps perfectly onto Keith Stanton’s “pocket-based” model of incrementalism, which would sit 
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50. 
49 Chris DL Hunt, ‘Rethinking surreptitious takings in the law of confidence’ [2011] IPQ 66, 73. Hunt borrows 
the phrase “impermissible violence” from Tom Bingham, ‘Should There Be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal 
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50 Coco, n 23. 
51 Alexandra Sims, ‘“A shift in the centre of gravity”: the dangers of protecting privacy through breach of 
confidence’ [2005] IPQ 27, 28. 
I would make two points in response to such an objection. First, Hunt’s diagnosis of Campbell’s 
radicalness is based firmly on his view that Lord Goff’s reformulation of equitable confidence 
in Spycatcher is simply not correct in law and ought not to have been followed by any 
subsequent court. As a matter of strict, formal law, this is a technically plausible position to 
take. But it does not hold much water as a statement of the position that the law had come to 
occupy – perhaps incorrectly, in strictly formal terms – by the time Campbell was decided. The 
Spycatcher formulation had unarguably come to be regarded judicially as an accurate statement 
of equitable confidence’s elements. Second, there is a strong undercurrent of formalism evident 
in Hunt’s argument. He is concerned that equitable confidence ought to retain its traditional 
shape. Moreover, if it is to develop, it ought not to do so in a manner that conflicts with what 
he identifies as its informing principles: “the twin policies of relationship preservation and of 
remedying unconscionable conduct”.52 In making these concerns the centrepiece of his 
argument, Hunt prioritises maintaining the traditional shape of an equitable doctrine over 
maintaining certainty in tort. His ideal solution to the problem he identifies is – perhaps 
surprisingly – the same as that which I criticise the House in Campbell for not pursuing: the 
recognition of a clearly distinct, novel privacy tort. There is, then, a problematic tension in 
Hunt’s argument (and in the arguments of those who take a similar line53) between his strong 
desire to maintain certainty in equity and his enthusiasm for the adoption of a wholly novel 
head of liability in tort, unrelated to equitable confidence. It is clearly difficult to consistently 
square a strong commitment to formal rule of law concerns such as the maintenance of legal 
certainty with the realisation that privacy interests are important and ought to be taken seriously 
by the common law. 
 
2.2 Post-Campbell cases 
 
I have documented elsewhere the impact that a decision not to recognise either a broad privacy 
tort or a discrete tort of “intrusion upon seclusion” has subsequently had on one aspect of the 
law.54 This is the rather unforeseeable – and formally difficult to explain – development of the 
“third party interests” doctrine, according to which the interests of individuals who are not 
party to the proceedings are nevertheless accorded significant weight by the court when 
determining an MPI claim (which would normally be a purely bilateral affair between claimant 
and defendant). In this section, I explore another formal difficulty resulting from the decision 
in Campbell. This is the difficulty in determining the very nature of MPI – whether it is 
equitable, tortious, or something else entirely. 
                                                          
52 Hunt, n 49, 72. 
53 Examples include Sims, n 51; Arye Schreiber, ‘Confidence crisis, privacy phobia: why invasion of privacy 
should be independently recognised in English law’ [2006] IPQ 160; Rachael Mulheron, ‘A Potential 
Framework For Privacy? A Reply To Hello!’ (2006) 69(5) MLR 679. 
54 Thomas DC Bennett, ‘Privacy, third parties and judicial method: Wainwright’s legacy of uncertainty’ (2015) 
7(2) Journal of Media Law 251. In that article, I traced the root of the problem back to the case of Wainwright (n 
45). Wainwright was heard by the House of Lords in the year preceding its hearing of Campbell. In that case, the 
House rejected the claimants’ argument that it ought to recognise a general privacy tort. The argument made in 
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ruling could just as appropriately be levelled at Wainwright. However, since Campbell gave the House the 
opportunity to revisit its broad rejection of the idea of a tort of privacy, it remains just as appropriate to level 
that criticism at the Campbell decision. 
 Some post-Campbell privacy cases seem to confirm the existence of both traditional equitable 
confidentiality and MPI as separate causes of action with differing focuses,55 whilst others 
prefer the notion of a single, modified cause of action.56 And yet other cases equivocate on 
whether these comprise one cause of action with interchangeable names or two separate 
doctrines.57 A further possibility, barely touched upon in the case law, is that MPI is neither 
tortious nor equitable, but is instead something entirely new. Given the strong influence that 
the European Convention on Human Rights had on its development and content, the notion 
that it is a sort-of “hybrid”58 doctrine encompassing equitable, tortious and higher-order public 
law principles (i.e. Convention rights) is one that might at the very least have been worth 
exploring. It is hinted at in the Court of Appeal’s judgment in McKennitt, wherein Buxton LJ 
comments that Arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR are now “the very content of the domestic tort that 
the English court has to enforce” but the courts have not pursued that line of thinking with any 
vigour since he made those remarks in 2006.59 
 
To make matters worse, the confusion continues even within individual judgments in post-
Campbell privacy cases. The 2014 case of Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd highlights this 
problem.60 In Weller, Dingemans J identifies the claimants’ claim as “an action for breach of 
confidence”, remarking that this cause of action has been “renamed … misuse of private 
information”.61 Elsewhere in the judgment, however, he paints a subtly different picture, for he 
tells us that “claims for misuse of private information were absorbed into the established claim 
for breach of confidence” some years ago.62 And in yet another place he identifies MPI as a 
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56 In Murray v Express Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch), [2007] EMLR 22, Patten J clearly believes 
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neither judge precisely repeats their views from Campbell, and, indeed, may each be thought to have changed 
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58 Alastair Mullis and Ken Oliphant, Torts (4th edn, Palgrave MacMillan 2011) 3. 
59 McKennitt, n 57, [11]. 
60 [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB), [2014] EMLR 24. In Weller, Dingemans J gave judgment on a claim for misuse of 
private information in respect of photographs taken by a paparazzo in California of (well-known musician) Paul 
Weller’s children.  
61 Weller, n 6060, [24] (emphasis added). 
62 Ibid, [20] (emphasis added). 
“new cause of action”.63 Thus, in the space of just five paragraphs, Dingemans J stakes out 
three quite different positions on the nature of the claim at hand. It is highly unlikely that this 
was deliberate – indeed the learned judge may not even have considered the distinctions drawn 
within his own use of terminology.64 But this alone highlights the depth of the difficulty which 
the ambiguity surrounding this cause of action’s doctrinal roots has caused. 
 
The 2004 judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting is also revealing, 
since it provides an external perspective.65 In Hosking, the Court was presented with an 
opportunity to clarify the manner in which New Zealand law dealt with informational privacy 
violations. Given the option to expand the existing doctrine of confidence, the court preferred 
to recognise openly a novel head of tortious liability protecting private information. In so doing, 
the court established a “private facts” tort. The judgment sheds light on the confusion 
engendered by the ways in which the English law of confidence was put to use, between the 
House of Lords’ cases of Spycatcher in 1988 and Campbell (which was handed down shortly 
after Hosking) in 2004, in order to provide a remedy in cases dealing with the public disclosure 
of private matters.66 The New Zealand Court of Appeal, endeavouring to make sense of the 
English authorities, proclaimed that, by 2004 (just before the House of Lords’ decision in 
Campbell was handed down) English law recognised “two quite distinct versions of the tort of 
breach of confidence.”67 
 
One is the long-standing cause of action applicable alike to companies and 
private individuals under which remedies are available in respect of use or 
disclosure where the information has been communicated in confidence. … The 
second gives a right of action in respect of the publication of personal 
information of which the subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
irrespective of any burden of confidence… The first formulation reflects the 
historical approach to the law of torts with the focus on wrongful conduct 
whereas the second reflects more the impact of a developing rights-based 
approach.68 
 
This statement is starkly indicative of the problem this doctrinal uncertainty has caused. For it 
contains mutually incompatible statements on the nature of the English causes of action. Thus 
                                                          
63 Ibid, [22] (emphasis added). 
64 The judge did note that the question of whether MPI was tortious or equitable was, at the time, being 
considered by the Court of Appeal, and that it was not his intention to settle that question in this case: “It might 
be noted that the issue of whether the cause of action for misuse of private information is now a separate tort, as 
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67 Hosking, n 65, [42]. 
68 Ibid, [42]. 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal is led to identify (wrongly, at least at a formal level) the 
long-standing equitable doctrine of confidence as a tort (an error the English Court of Appeal 
also made in McKennitt).69 Having done so, it further recognises a second tort dealing with 
private, rather than confidential, information, which had apparently appeared at some point 
after Spycatcher but clearly before the House of Lords’ decision in Campbell (which had not 
been handed down when Hosking was decided). The fault here lies not with the judges in 
Hosking but rather with the confused state of English law at the time and the lack of a clear, 
universal understanding of its development. 
 
Ten years after Campbell, the English courts were required, for the first time, to decide whether 
MPI is a tortious or equitable cause of action in the case of Vidal-Hall v Google Inc.70 The claim 
was brought in respect of information obtained and (according to the claimants) misused by the 
defendant through the installation of “cookies” on their computers via their web browsers. At 
the case’s first hearing before Tugendhat J, in the High Court, this was decided as a preliminary 
matter; it was necessary to determine whether the claims – pleaded in both MPI and breach of 
confidence – were amenable to service upon Google Inc outside the jurisdiction of England and 
Wales. (Under the Civil Procedure Rules as they stood at the time, tort claims could be served 
extra-jurisdictionally, but non-tort claims could not.71) Tugendhat J concluded that MPI exists 
as a head of tortious liability, distinct from equitable confidentiality. The MPI claim could 
therefore be served, but a separate claim in breach of confidence – being equitable rather than 
tortious – could not.72  
 
Unfortunately, and most likely due to the necessarily brief nature of legal proceedings regarding 
preliminary issues, it must be said (with great respect) that the learned judge’s reasoning lacks 
the detail and depth needed to provide wholesome support for his conclusion. From the 
judgment, it is plain that Tugendhat J is convinced that MPI is tortious, but that he finds it 
difficult to pin down a great deal of supporting evidence.  
 
The case of Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No.3) was relied on heavily by counsel for Google as they 
endeavoured to show that MPI was not tortious.73 In Douglas (No.3), the claimants brought a 
claim in breach of confidence in order to protect their privacy in respect of surreptitiously-
taken photographs of their wedding ceremony in New York. This was the judgment in which 
the Court of Appeal infamously bemoaned that it could not 
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Plastmaschinen [1995] FSR 765 to hold that the action pleaded in breach of confidence was equitable (n 70 at 
[71]). 
73 [2003] EWHC 55 (Ch), [2003] EMLR 29. 
… pretend [to] find it satisfactory to be required to shoe-horn within the cause 
of action of breach of confidence claims for publication of unauthorised 
photographs of a private occasion.74 
 
In Douglas (No.3) (which Tugendhat J cites) the Court of Appeal held that “the effect of shoe-
horning this type of claim into the cause of action [for] breach of confidence means that it does 
not fall to be treated as a tort under English law”.75 The court in Douglas (No.3) was, at this 
point, considering whether s.9 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1995 applied, a question which it answered in the negative. In Vidal-Hall, counsel for Google 
submitted that, in this part of Douglas (No.3), the court was referring to what Lord Nicholls 
had (in Campbell) called the tort of misuse of private information. Tugendhat J rejected this, 
holding that the Court of Appeal’s remarks in Douglas (No.3) referred to the equitable doctrine 
of confidence only. In support of this, Tugendhat J noted that this was the only possible doctrine 
to which the judge in Douglas (No.3), Lindsay J, could have been referring, given that the first 
instance decision pre-dated Campbell by nearly a year.76 He also states that Lord Nicholls’ 
reference in OBG, four years after Campbell, to “two distinct causes of action” supports his 
conclusion that MPI and breach of confidence are separate from one another.77  
 
Tugendhat J concludes this portion of his judgment by looking (much more briskly) at cases in 
which his brethren on the bench have identified MPI in tortious terms. He notes that the phrase 
“misuse of private information” has become a legal term of art which has frequently, if not 
consistently, been identified by courts as a tort.78 These uses, he holds, “cannot be dismissed 
as all errors in the use of the words [sic] ‘tort’.”79 The Court of Appeal, when it considered 
Vidal-Hall, also pursued this line of reasoning, remarking that these judicial uses of the term 
“tort” in relation to MPI “connote an acknowledgement … of the true nature of the cause of 
action.”80 
 
However, whilst there may be some underlying, intuitive veracity to the notion that if 
something is generally treated as a tort then it probably is one, the mere repeated judicial use 
of the term “tort” is not, in itself, conclusive proof of its accuracy. For neither the common law 
nor equity has ever had much truck with the notion that labels provide conclusive proof of 
content. As Hunt puts it, “repetition does not transform a falsity into a truth”.81 Indeed, since 
Tugendhat J was the first judge to consider this question of MPI’s classification as a disputed 
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point of law, it is apparent that no previous reference to the doctrine as tortious was founded 
on detailed judicial analysis or, indeed, detailed submissions from counsel, relating to its 
nature. This must call into question the reliability and suitability of those references for the 
purpose for which Tugendhat J uses them.  
 
When Vidal-Hall reached the Court of Appeal, the defendant repeated its argument based on 
the decision in Douglas (No.3). It argued that the identification of the basis of that claim as 
equitable amounted to a binding declaration that the only cause of action available in these 
sorts of informational privacy cases was that one, same, equitable doctrine. The Court of 
Appeal rejects outright this argument of Google’s, remarking that the Douglas (No.3) 
observations were obiter rather than ratio.82  
 
The Court first notes counsel for Google’s “uncontroversial proposition” that, following the 
coming into force of the HRA, the gap in protection for Art.8 interests in respect of 
informational privacy was bridged by the courts “developing and adapting” the older equitable 
doctrine of confidence “to protect [claimants from] the misuse of private information”.83 The 
Court points to the decision in A v B as an example of that process, wherein the Court of Appeal 
“absorb[ed] the rights which articles 8 and 10 protect into the long-established action for breach 
of confidence”.84 One unfortunate aspect of the Court of Appeal’s judgment becomes apparent 
at this point. This is that the Court is mobilising a range of under-determinate terminology in 
order to describe the developmental process by which privacy law developed in the early years 
of the HRA. The process is described as one of development, adaptation and absorption. There 
is a significant semantic tension between, on the one hand, these descriptions of the process 
and, on the other, the Court’s clear belief that “[a]lthough the process may have started as one 
of ‘absorption’ … it is clear that … there are now two separate and distinct causes of action”.85 
For the descriptive terms used imply strong, internal continuity; they give rise to the intuitive 
understanding that a single cause of action has been “developed” and “adapted”, and that 
protection for a particular type of interest (i.e. privacy) has been “absorbed” into it. Thus, when 
the Court, just a paragraph later, subsequently asserts that two distinct actions now exist, it is 
not at all apparent that (and no explanation is offered of how) this can be the case. Given this 
rather baffling use of language, it is clear that this judgment, too, requires close scrutiny. 
 
When one unpacks the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Vidal-Hall, it becomes apparent that it 
rests upon three strands of argument.86 The three strands may be summarised as follows: (i) as 
a matter of substance, “confidentiality” and “privacy” are distinct from one another and give 
expression to “different interests”; (ii) the law is still developing, and the ongoing process of 
development that began as one of “absorbing” privacy claims within confidentiality has 
reached a point where “there are now two separate and distinct causes of action”; and (iii) MPI 
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has frequently (if not always consistently) been referred to by the judiciary as a “tort”.87 Thus 
strand (i) is substantive, relating to the informing principles underpinning these causes of 
action, whilst (ii) and (iii) are essentially empirical (and purely descriptive) observations. 
 
At a formal level, these three strands of the Court’s reasoning are problematic. None of them 
gives any hint of the method by which the law relating to “confidentiality” and “privacy” has 
developed in such a way as to give expression to these “different interests”. They say nothing 
about the doctrinal roots of MPI. The judgment is also unhelpfully vague about just what these 
“different interests” in strand (i) are. We are likely to be on fairly safe ground if we assume the 
Court has in mind the protection of equitable ideals of trust and confidence (the maintenance 
of the relationship of trust between confidants) when it talks of “confidentiality”. We can 
similarly make the assumption (although we are arguably on less certain ground if we do88) 
that it is drawing on the sorts of dignity and autonomy-based concerns that the Strasbourg Court 
regards as central to Art.8 ECHR when it talks of “privacy”.89 
 
Moreover, (ii) is not really a strand of argument at all; rather it is the very question that the 
Court is considering. To simply assert that “there are now two separate and distinct causes of 
action” does not provide an explanation of how they came into being. Likewise strand (iii) says 
nothing about how MPI came into its own as a tort. Its reliance here on frequent judicial 
descriptions of MPI as a “tort” perhaps provides useful evidence that MPI appears, as a matter 
of semantic empiricism, to be identified frequently as tortious – but it cannot explain its 
emergence as a tort. We are thus left with a judgment that provides a bare answer to the 
question posed. Its reasoning does not – at any point – give any clue as to the Court’s 
understanding of just how MPI emerged as a tort.  
 
When the Court offers a (brief) account of the HRA era case law during which MPI has 
developed, it fares no better. For instance, the Court quite rightly identifies Lord Nicholls’ 
judgment in Campbell as “highly influential”.90 Yet the Court – despite regarding this as 
“highly influential” – does not explicitly state that Campbell was the point at which MPI 
emerged in tortious form. Instead, it leaps ahead (with an appropriately dramatic “four years 
later”) to the House of Lords’ decision in OBG (in which Lord Nicholls stated that the law had 
developed “two distinct causes of action” for confidence and privacy).91 Thus it leaves us with 
an analysis-free four-year period during which, presumably, the Court believes MPI gained its 
status as a distinct tort (without being conclusively labelled as such by our highest court). 
                                                          
87 The Court of Appeal cites, as examples of MPI being described judicially as a “tort”, McKennitt, n 57; Lord 
Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [2008] QB 103; Murray v Express 
Newspapers, n 56; Tchenguiz v Imerman, n 55. 
88 Given the history of judicial reluctance to define “privacy” in English law, we probably have less secure 
grounds to assume this is the Court’s understanding of “privacy” than we had for making our assumptions about 
its understanding of “confidentiality”. 
89 See, for example, Reklos v Greece [2009] EMLR 16, [39] (on “autonomy”); Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 
35 EHRR 1: “the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of [the] 
guarantees [in Article 8]”, (at [61]); “The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity…” (at 
[65]). 
90 Vidal-Hall (CA), n 80, [22]. 
91 OBG, n 38, [255]; Vidal-Hall (CA), ibid, [24]. 
Bafflingly, it is on the developments in the law during this remarkable – and clearly highly 
significant – period of change that the Court is silent. 
 
The Court of Appeal rather lets the proverbial cat out of the bag when, in concluding on the 
issue of MPI’s classification, it remarks: 
 
if one puts aside the circumstances of its “birth”, there is nothing in the nature 
of the claim itself to suggest that the more natural classification of it as a tort 
is wrong.92 
 
This is surely the clearest possible admission that the Court was unable to identify the 
“circumstances of [MPI’s] birth”. In this regard, it has thus fared no better than the High Court 
in its efforts (indeed, Tugendhat J’s analysis is the more detailed of the two). And so 
irrespective of the correctness (or otherwise) of the conclusion reached, the judgment leaves 
unanswered a key question: if MPI is tortious then how, as a matter of formal law, did it come 
into being? 
 
It has not been my aim to answer that question in this essay. But it is important to note that it 
has yet to be satisfactorily answered. For it arises directly because of the “shoe-horning” 
approach to the development of MPI to which English courts have committed themselves in 
the post-Campbell era. The insistence on “shoe-horning” privacy claims into the 
confidence/post-confidence vehicle is symptomatic of an approach to judging that 
determinedly restricts the development of the law to taking place on a narrowly incremental 
basis. This bears all the hallmarks of being based on a restrictive conception of the judicial role, 
related to a formalistic conception of the rule of law that prioritises the maintenance of legal 
certainty. Somewhat ironically, it is this deliberate subordination by the House of Lords of its 
creative powers to the restraining impulse of narrow incrementalism that has led to the 
considerable uncertainty and confusion that renders the very nature of the cause of action to 
which Campbell is credited with giving rise unclear. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Critics might object to my argument by saying that, whatever the judges in Campbell might 
have said at the time, the manner in which the doctrine of MPI has subsequently been 
interpreted and applied by the lower courts indicates that what happened in Campbell was 
highly significant. For if we now have a new tort utilising a novel methodology that is providing 
relief in novel circumstances, is that not proof enough of Campbell’s activism? The argument 
behind such an objection is that there is no smoke without fire. Post hoc ergo propter hoc. 
 
To such an objection, I would respond that, as we have seen, there is no clear, formal evidence 
– either in Campbell itself or in subsequent cases – that Campbell heralded the recognition of 
a novel tort, only that it did … something. And suddenly we had this thing called “misuse of 
                                                          
92 Vidal-Hall (CA), ibid, [43]. 
private information” and lawyers were scrabbling around wondering what to do with it, when 
to plead it, how it worked and which remedies it might help them secure for their clients. Whilst 
judges and academics alike have tended to assume that Campbell did give rise to a novel tort, 
there has been no detailed academic examination of the case law with the intention of proving 
it. The evidence we have examined in this essay casts doubt on whether this could indeed be 
proved. The existence of smoke does not prove the existence of a fire; many faulty things 
produce smoke. Moreover, whilst the High Court and Court of Appeal have agreed in the case 
of Vidal-Hall that MPI is tortious, the judicial analysis in those two cases is unconvincing, 
leaving a number of important questions entirely unanswered.  
 
Thus, even if MPI is tortious, its recognition was most certainly not the product of a clear, 
positive decision to recognise a novel tort. Rather its current status – recognised as a tort by the 
Court of Appeal – is simply one possible rationalisation of a hodgepodge of other decisions in 
which its status has not been in issue and was consequently not considered in any detail. 
 
Campbell itself was not a particularly activist decision. It moved the law relating to privacy 
along, but only to a limited extent. In taking this narrowly incremental approach, the House 
appears to have been keen to pre-empt and avoid criticism for being “activist” – that is, for 
undermining legal certainty and the rule of law. And yet it is demonstrable that taking this 
narrowly incremental approach has not given us the legal certainty in respect of our common 
law privacy protections that we might have expected. Indeed, it has led to considerable 
uncertainty both in respect of the “third party interests” doctrine upon which I have previously 
written elsewhere, and in respect of the very nature of the cause of action that Campbell is said 
to have given us. 
 
From this, it is entirely arguable that the House of Lords could more usefully have taken a 
significantly more activist approach in Campbell. Had the House of Lords recognised MPI as 
a novel and distinct tort there and then, the problem of uncertainty upon which we have dwelt 
would not have arisen, at least not in terms of the nature of the doctrine. A move to recognise 
clearly a novel, broadly-framed cause of action – most likely in tort – to guard against invasions 
of privacy, or to recognise a number of discrete torts to cover the same ground, would have 
required the House to operate in a significantly wider mode of incrementalism. But doing so 
would still have been defensible. For, as Sir Michael Tugendhat rightly contends, courts may 
legitimately extend – and have on a number of occasions legitimately extended – the law quite 
significantly. The key to engaging in defensible incrementalism is maintaining a link with past 
judicial decisions. But this need not mean a rigid adherence to the limits of existing precedent. 
It can legitimately mean recognising novel heads of liability where doing so is necessary in 
order, for example, to give effect to an underlying principle of justice.  
 
And whilst it is certainly not the only – and probably not even the primary – reason to think 
that such a move would have been beneficial, it might well have prevented the very problem 
of uncertainty by which those who tend to criticise “activist” decisions are particularly 
troubled. 
